Capability Repertoire Hierarchy
The concept of our H-LAM/T system possessing a repertoire
of capabilities that is structured in the form of a hierarchy
is most useful in our study. We shall use it in the following
to tie together a number of considerations and concepts. There
are two points of focus in considering the design of new repertoire
hierarchies: the materials with which we have to work, and the
principles by which new capability is constructed from these
basic materials.
a. Basic Capabilities
"Materials" in this context are those capabilities
in the human and in the artifact domains from which all other
capabilities in the repertoire hierarchy must be constructed.
Each such basic capability represents a type of functional component
with which the system can be built, and a thorough job of redesigning
the system calls for making an inventory of the basic capabilities
available. Because we are exploring for perspective, and not
yet recommending research activities, we are free to discuss
and define in more detail what we mean by "basic capability",
without regard to the amount of research involved in making an
actual inventory.
The two domains, human and artifact, can be explored separately
for their basic capabilities, In each we can isolate two classes
of basic capability; these classes are distinguished according
to whether or not the capability has been put to use within out
augmentation means. The first class (those in use) can be found
in a methodical manner by analyzing present capability hierarchies.
For example, select a given capability, at any level in the hierarchy,
and ask yourself if it can be usefully changed by any means that
can be given consideration in the augmentation research contemplated,
If it can, then it is not basic but it can be decomposed into
an eventual set of basic capabilities. As you proceed down through
the hierarchy, you will begin to encounter capabilities that
cannot be usefully changed, and these will make up your inventory
of basic capabilities. Ultimately, every such recursive decomposition
of a given capability in the hierarchy will find every one of
its branching paths terminated by basic capabilities. Beginning
such decomposition search with different capabilities in the
hierarchy will eventually uncover all of those basic capabilities
used within that hierarchy or augmentation system. Many of the
branching paths in the decomposition of a given higher-order
capability will terminate in the same basic capability, since
a given basic capability will often be used within many different
higher-order capabilities.
Determining the class of basic capabilities not already utilized
within existing augmentation systems requires a different exploration
method. Examples of this method occur in technological research,
where analytically oriented researchers search for new understandings
of phenomena that can add to the research engineer's list of
things to be used in the synthesis of better artifacts.
Before this inventorying task can be pursued in any specific
instance, some criteria must be established as to what possible
changes within the H-LAM/T system can be given serious consideration.
For instance, some research situations might have to disallow
changes which require extensive retraining, or which require
undignified behavior by the human. Other situations might admit
changes requiring years of special training, very expensive equipment,
or the use of special drugs.
The capability for performing a certain finger action, for
example, may not be basic in our sense of the word. Being able
to extend the finger a certain distance would be basic but the
strength and speed of a particular finger motion and its coordination
with higher actions generally are usefully changeable and therefore
do not represent basic capabilities. What would be basic in this
case would perhaps be the processes whereby strength could be
increased and coordinated movement patterns learned, as well
as the basic movement range established by the mechanical-limit
loci of the muscle-tendon-bone system. Similar capability breakdowns
will occur for sensory and cognitive capabilities.
b Structure Types
1) General
The fundamental principle used in building sophisticated capabilities
from the basic capabilities is structuring--the special type
of structuring (which we have termed synergetic) in which the
organization of a group of elements produces an effect greater
than the mere addition of their individual effects. Perhaps "purposeful"
structuring (or organization) would serve us as well, but since
we aren't sure yet how the structuring concept must mature for
our needs, we shall tentatively stick with the special modifier,
"synergetic." We are developing a growing awareness
of the significant and pervasive nature of such structure within
every physical and conceptual thing we inspect, where the hierarchical
form seems almost universally present as stemming from successive
levels of such organization.
The fundamental entities that are being structured in each
and every case seems to be what we could call processes, where
the most basic of physical processes (involving fields, charges,
and momenta associated with the dynamics of fundamental particles)
appear to be the hierarchical base. There are dynamic electro-optical-mechanical
processes associated with the function of our artifacts (as well
as metabolic, sensory, motor) and cognitive processes of the
human, which we find to be relatively fundamental components
within the structure of our H-LAM/T system--and each of these
seems truly to be ultimately based (to our degree of understanding)
upon the above mentioned basic physical processes. The elements
that are organized to give fixed structural form to our physical
objects--e.g., the "element" of tensile strength of
a material-are also derived from what we could call synergetic
structuring of the most basic physical processes.
But at the level of the capability hierarchy where we wish
to work, it seems useful to us to distinguish several different
types of structuring--even though each type is fundamentally
a structuring of the basic physical processes. Tentatively we
have isolated five such types--although we are not sure how many
we shall ultimately want to use in considering the problem of
augmenting the human intellect, nor how we might divide and subdivide
these different manifestations of physical-process structuring.
We use the terms "mental structuring", "concept
structuring", "symbol structuring", "process
structuring," and "physical structuring."
2) Mental Structuring
Mental structuring is what we call the internal organization
of conscious and unconscious mental images, associations, or
concepts (or whatever it is that is organized within the human
mind) that somehow manages to provide the human with understanding
and the basis for such as judgment, intuition, inference, and
meaningful action with respect to his environment. There is a
term used in psychology, cognitive structure, which so far seems
to represent just what we want for our concept of mental structure,
but we will not adopt it until we become more sure of what the
accepted psychological meaning is and of what we want for our
conceptual framework.
For our present purpose, it is irrelevant to worry over what
the fundamental mental "things" being structured are,
or what mechanisms are accomplishing the structuring or making
use of what has been structured. We feel reasonably safe in assuming
that learning involves some kind of meaningful organization within
the brain, and that whatever is so organized or structured represents
the operating model of the individual's universe to the mental
mechanisms that derive his behavior. And further, our assumption
is that when the human in our H/LAM system makes the key decision
or action that leads to the solution of a complex problem, it
will stem from the state of his mental structure at that time.
In this view then, the basic purpose of the system's activity
on that problem up to that point has been to develop his mental
structure to the state from which the mental mechanisms could
derive the key action.
Our school systems attest that there are specific experiences
that can be given to a human that will result in development
of his mental structure to the point where the behavior derived
there from by his mental mechanisms shows us that he has gained
new comprehension--in other words, we can do a certain amount
from outside the human toward developing his mental structure.
Independent students and researchers also attest that internally
directed behavior on the part of an individual can directly aid
his structure-building process.
We don't know whether a mental structure is developed in a
manner analogous to (a) development of a garden, where one provides
a good environment, plants the seeds, keeps competing weeds and
injurious pests out, but otherwise has to let natural processes
take their course, or to (b) development of a basketball team,
where much exercise of skills, patterns, and strategies must
be provided so that natural processes can slowly knit together
an integration, or to (c) development of a machine, where carefully
formed elements are assembled in a precise, planned manner so
that natural phenomena can immediately yield planned function.
We don't know the processes, but we can and have developed empirical
relationships between the experiences given a human and the associated
manifestations of developing comprehension and capability, and
we see the near-future course of the research toward augmenting
the human's intellect as depending entirely upon empirical findings
(past and future) for the development of better means to serve
the development and use of mental structuring in the human.
We don't mean to imply by this that we renounce theories of
mental processes. What we mean to emphasize is that pursuit of
our objective need not wait upon the understanding of the mental
processes that accomplish (what we call) mental structuring and
that derive behavior therefrom. It would be to ignore the emphases
of our own conceptual framework not to make fullest use of any
theory that provided a working explanation for a group of empirical
data. What's more, our entire conceptual framework represents
the first pass at a "theoretical model with which to organize
our thinking and action."
3) Concept Structuring
Within our framework we have developed the working assumption
that the manner in which we seem to be able to provide experiences
that favor the development of our mental structures is based
upon concepts as a "medium of exchange." We view a
concept as a tool that can be grasped and used by the mental
mechanisms, that can be composed, interpreted, and used by the
natural mental substances and processes. The grasping and handling
done by these mechanisms can often be facilitated if the concept
is given an explicit "handle" in the form of a representative
symbol. Somehow the mental mechanisms can learn to manipulate
images (or something) of symbols in a meaningful way and remain
calmly confident that the associated conceptual manipulations
are within call.
Concepts seem to be structurable, in that a new concept can
be composed of an organization of established concepts. For present
purposes, we can view a concept structure as something
which we might try to develop on paper for ourselves or work
with by conscious thought processes, or as something which we
try to communicate to one another in serious discussion. We assume
that, for a given unit of comprehension to be imparted, there
is a concept structure (which can be consciously developed and
displayed) that can be presented to an individual in such a way
that it is mapped into a corresponding mental structure which
provides the basis for that individual's "comprehending"
behavior. Our working assumption also considers that some concept
structures would be better for this purpose than others, in that
they would be more easily mapped by the individual into workable
mental structures, or in that the resulting mental structures
enable a higher degree of comprehension and better solutions
to problems, or both.
A concept structure often grows as part of a cultural evolution--either
on a large scale within a large segment of society, or on a small
scale within the activity domain of an individual. But it is
also something that can be directly designed or modified, and
a basic hypothesis of our study is that better concept structures
can be developed-- structures that when mapped into a human's
mental structure will significantly improve his capability to
comprehend and to find solutions within his complex-problem situations.
A natural language provides its user with a readymade structure
of concepts that establishes a basic mental structure, and that
allows relatively flexible, general-purpose concept structuring.
Our concept of language as one of the basic means for augmenting
the human intellect embraces all of the concept structuring which
the human may make use of.
4) Symbol Structuring
The other important part of our "language" is the
way in which concepts are represented--the symbols and symbol
structures. Words structured into phrases, sentences, paragraphs,
monographs--charts, lists, diagrams, tables, etc. A given structure
of concepts can be represented by any of an infinite number of
different symbol structures, some of which would be much better
than others for enabling the human perceptual and cognitive apparatus
to search out and comprehend the conceptual matter of significance
and/or interest to the human. For instance, a concept structure
involving many numerical data would generally be much better
represented with Arabic rather than Roman numerals and quite
likely a graphic structure would be better than a tabular structure.
But it is not only the form of a symbol structure that
is important. A problem solver is involved in a stream of conceptual
activity whose course serves his mental needs of the moment.
The sequence and nature of these needs are quite variable, and
yet for each need he may benefit significantly from a form of
symbol structuring that is uniquely efficient for that need.
Therefore, besides the forms of symbol structures that can
be constructed and portrayed, we are very much concerned with
the speed and flexibility with which one form can be transfcrmed
into another, and with which new material can be located and
portrayed.
We are generally used to thinking of our symbol structures
as a pattern of marks on a sheet of paper. When we want a different
symbol-structure view, we think of shifting our point of attention
on the sheet, or moving a new sheet into position. But another
kind of view might be obtained by extracting and ordering all
statements in the local text that bear upon consideration A of
the argument--or by replacing all occurrences of specified esoteric
words by one's own definitions. This sort of "view generation"
becomes quite feasible with a computer-controlled display system,
and represents a very significant capability to build upon.
With a computer manipulating our symbols and generating their
portrayals to us on a display, we no longer need think of our
looking at the symbol structure which is stored--as we
think of looking at the symbol structures stored in notebooks,
memos, and books. What the computer actually stores need be none
of our concern, assuming that it can portray symbol structures
to us that are consistent with the form in which we think our
information is structured.
A given concept structure can be represented with a symbol
structure that is completely compatible with the computer's internal
way of handling symbols, with all sorts of characteristics and
relationships given explicit identifications that the user may
never directly see. In fact, this structuring has immensely greater
potential for accurately mapping a complex concept structure
than does a structure an individual would find it practical to
construct or use on paper.
The computer can transform back and forth between the two-dimensional
portrayal on the screen, of some limited view of the total structure,
and the aspect of the n-dimensional internal image that represents
this "view". If the human adds to or modifies such
a "view," the computer integrates the change into the
internal-image symbol structure (in terms of the computer's favored
symbols and structuring) and thereby automatically detects a
certain proportion of his possible conceptual inconsistencies.
Thus, inside this instrument (the computer) there is an internal-image,
computer-symbol structure whose convolutions and multi-dimensionality
we can learn to shape to represent to hitherto unattainable accuracy
the concept structure we might be building or working with. This
interna1 structure may have a form that is nearly incomprehensible
to the direct inspection of a human (except in minute chunks).
But let the human specify to the instrument his particular
conceptual need of the moment, relative to this internal image.
Without disrupting its own internal reference structure in the
slightest, the computer will effectively stretch, bend, fold,
extract, and cut as it may need in order to assemble an internal
substructure that is its respons, structured in its own internal
way. With the set of standard translation rules appropriate to
the situation, it portrays to the human via its display a symbol
structure designed for his quick and accurate perception
and comprehension of the conceptual matter pertinent to this
internally composed substructure.
No longer does the human work on stiff and limited symbol
structures, where much of the conceptual content can only be
implicitly designated in an indirect and distributed fashion.
These new ways of working are basically available with today's
technology--we have but to free ourselves from some of our limiting
views and begin experimenting with compatible sets of structure
forms and processes for human concepts, human symbols, and machine
symbols.
5) Process Structuring
Essentially everything that goes on within the H-LAM/T system
and that is of direct interest here involves the manipulation
of concept and symbol structures in service to the mental structure.
Therefore, the processes within the H-LAM/T system that we are
most interested in developing are those that provide for the
manipulation of all three types of structure. This brings us
to the fourth category of structuring, process structuring.
As we are currently using it, the term
includes the organization, study, modification, and execution
of processes and process structures. Whereas concept structuring
and symbol structuring together represent the language component
of our augmentation means, process structuring represents the
methodology component (plus a little more, actually). There has
been enough previous discussion of process structures that we
need not describe the notion here, beyond perhaps an example
or two. The individual processes (or actions) of my hands and
fingers have to be cooperatively organized if the typewriter
is to do my bidding. My successive actions throughout my working
day are meant to cooperate toward a certain over-all professional
goal.
Many of the process structures are applied to the task of
organizing, executing, supervising, and evaluating other process
structures. Many of them are applied to the formation and manipulation
of symbol structures (the purpose of which will often be to support
the conceptual labor involved in process structuring).
6) Physical Structuring
Physical structuring, the last of the five types which
we currently use in our conceptual framework, is nearly self-explanatory.
It pretty well represents the artifact component of our augmentation
means, insofar as their actual physical construction is concerned.
7) Interdependence and Regeneration
A very important feature to be noted from the discussion in
this section bears upon the interdependence among the various
types of structuring which are involved in the H-LAM/T system,
where the capability for doing each type of structuring is dependent
upon the capability for doing one or more of the other types
of structuring. (Assuming that the physical structuring of the
system remains basically unchanged during the system's operation,
we exclude its dependence upon other factors in this discussion.)
This interdependence actually has a cyclic, regenerative nature
to it which is very significant to us. We have seen how the capability
for mental structuring is finally dependent, down the chain,
upon the process structuring (human, artifact, composite) that
enables symbol-structure manipulation. But it also is evident
that the process structuring is dependent not only upon basic
human and artifact process capabilities, but upon the ability
of the human to learn how to execute processes--and no less important,
upon the ability of the human to select, organize, and modify
processes from his repertoire to structure a higher-order process
that he can execute. Thus, a capability for structuring and executing
processes is partially dependent upon the human's mental structuring,
which in turn is partially dependent upon his process structuring
(through concept and symbol structuring), which is partially
dependent upon his mental structuring, etc.
All of this means that a significant improvement in symbol-structure
manipulation through better process structuring (initially perhaps
through much better artifacts) should enable us to develop improvements
in concept and mental-structure manipulations that can in turn
enable us to organize and execute symbol-manipulation processes
of increased power. To most people who initially consider the
possibilities for computer-like devices augmenting the human
intellect, it is only the one-pass improvement that comes to
mind, which presents a picture that is relatively barren compared
to that which emerges when one considers this regenerative interaction.
We can confidently expect the development of much more powerful
concepts pertaining to the manner in which symbol structures
can be manipulated and portrayed, and correspondingly more complex
manipulation processes that in the first pass would have been
beyond the human's power to organize and execute without the
better symbol, concept, and mental structuring which his augmented
system provided him. These new concepts and processes, beyond
our present capabilities to use and thus never developed, will
provide a tremendous increased-capability payoff in the future
development of our augmentation means.
c. Roles and Levels
In the repertoire hierarchy of capabilities possessed by the
H-LAM/T system, the human contributes many types of capability
that represent a wide variety of roles. At one time or another
he will be the policy maker, the goal setter, the performance
supervisor, the work scheduler, the professional specialist,
the clerk, the janitor, the entrepreneur, and the proprietor
(or at least a major stockholder) of the system. In the midst
of some complex process, in fact, he may well be playing several
roles concurrently--or at least have the responsibility of the
roles. For instance, usually he must be aware of his progress
toward a goal (supervisor), he must be alert to the possibilities
for changing the goal (policy maker, planner), and he must keep
records for these and other roles (clerk).
Consider a given capability (Capability 1) at some level in
the repertoire hierarchy. There seems to be a sort of standard
grouping of lower-order capabilities from which this is composed,
and these exist in two classes--what we might call the executive
class and what we might call the direct-contributive
class. In the executive class of capabilities we find those used
for comprehending, planning, and executing the process represented
by Capability 1. In the direct-contributive class we find the
capabilities organized by the executive class toward the direct
realization of Capability 1. For example, when my telephone rings,
I execute the direct-contributive processes of picking up the
receiver and saying hello. It was the executive processes that
comprehended the situation, directed a lower-order executive-process
that the receiver be picked up and, when the receiver was in
place (first process accomplished), directed the next process,
the saying hello. That represents the composition of my capability
for answering the phone.
For a low-level capability, such as that of writing a word
with a pencil, both the executive and the direct-contributive
subprocesses during actual execution would be automatic. This
type of automatic capability need only be summoned by a higher
executive process in order for trained automatic responses to
execute it.
At a little higher level of capability, more of the conscious
conceptual and executive capabilities become involved. To call
someone on the telephone, I must consciously comprehend the need
for this process and how I can execute it, I must consciously
pick up the directory and search for the name and telephone number,
and I must consciously direct the dialing of the number.
At a still higher level of capability, the executive capabilities
must have a degree of power that unaided mental capabilities
cannot provide. In such a case, one might make a list of steps
and check each item off as it is executed. For an even more complex
process, comprehending the particular situation in which it is
to be executed, even before beginning to plan the execution,
may take months of labor and a very complex organization of the
system's capabilities.
Imagining a process as complex as the last example brings
us to the realization that at any particular moment the H-LAM/T
system may be in the middle of executing a great number of processes.
Assume that the human is in the middle of the process of making
a telephone call. That telephone call is a subprocess in the
middle of the process of calling a committee meeting. But calling
a committee meeting is a subprocess in the middle of the process
of determining a budgetary policy, which is in turn but a subprocess
in the middle of the process of estimating manpower needs, and
so on.
Not only does the human need to play various roles (sometimes
concurrently) in the execution of any given process, but he is
playing these roles for the many concurrent processes that are
being executed at different levels. This situation is typical
for any of us engaged in reasonably demanding types of professional
pursuits, and yet we have never received explicit training in
optimum ways of carrying out any but a very few of the roles
at a very few of the levels. A well-designed H-LAM/T system would
provide explicit and effective concepts, terms, equipment, and
methods for all these roles, and for their dynamic coordination.
d. Model of Executive Superstructure
It is the repertoire hierarchy of process capabilities upon
which the ultimate capability of the H-LAM/T system rests. This
repertoire hierarchy is rather like a mountain of white-collar
talent that sits atop and controls the talents of the workers.
We can illustrate this executive superstructure by considering
it as though it were a network of contractors and subcontractors
in which each capability in the repertoire hierarchy is represented
by an independent contractor whose mode of operation is to do
the planning, make up specifications, subcontract the actual
work, and supervise the performance of his subcontractors. This
means that each subcontractor does the same thing in his turn.
At the bottom of this hierarchy are those independent contractors
who do actual "production work."
If by some magical process the production workers could still
know just what to do and when to do it even though the superstructure
of contractors was removed from above them, no one would know
the difference. The executive superstructure is necessary because
humans do not operate by magic, but even a necessary superstructure
is a burden. We can readily recognize that there are many ways
to organize and manage such a superstructure, resulting in vastly
different degrees of efficiency in the application of the workers'
talents.
Suppose that the activity of the production workers was of
the same nature as the activity of the different contractors,
and that this activity consisted of gaining comprehension and
solving problems. And suppose that there was only so much applicable
talent available to the total system. The question now becomes
how to distribute that talent between superstructure and workers
to get the most total production. The efficiency of organization
within the superstructure is now doubly important so that a minimum
of talent in the superstructure produces a maximum of organizational
efficiency in directing the productivity of the remaining talent.
In the situation where talent is limited, we find a close
parallel to our H-LAM/T system in its pursuit of comprehension
and problem solutions. We obtain an even closer parallel if we
say that the thinking, planning, supervising, record keeping,
etc., for each contractor is actually done by a single individual
for the whole superstructure, time- sharing his attention and
talents over these many tasks. Today this individual cannot be
depended upon to have any special training for many of these
roles; he is likely to have learned them by cut and try and by
indirect imitation.
A complex process is often executed by the H-LAM/T system
in a multi-pass fashion (i.e., cut and try). In really complex
situations, comprehension and problem solutions do not stand
waiting at the end of a straightforward path; instead, possibilities
open up and plans shift as comprehension grows. In the model
using a network of contractors, this type of procedure would
entail a great deal of extra work within the superstructure--each
contractor involved in the process would have the specifications
upon which he bid continually changed, and would continually
have to respond to the changes by restudying the situation, changing
his plans, changing the specifications to his subcontractors,
and changing his records. This is a terrific additional burden,
but it allows a freedom of action that has tremendous importance
to the effectiveness the system exhibits to the outside world.
We could expect significant gains from automating the H- LAM/T
system if a computer could do nothing more than increase the
effectiveness of the executive processes. More human time, energy,
and productive thought could be allocated to direct-contributive
processes, which would be coordinated in a more sophisticated,
flexible and efficient manner. But there is every reason to believe
that the possibilities for much-improved symbol and process structuring
that would stem from this automation will directly provide improvements
in both the executive and direct-contributive processes in the
system.
e. Flexibility in the Executive Role
The executive superstructure is a necessary component in the
H-LAM/T system, and there is finite human capability which must
be divided between executive and direct-contributive activities.
An important aspect of the multi-role activity of the human in
the system is the development and manipulation of the symbol
structures associated with both his direct-contributive
roles and his executive roles.
When the system encounters a complex situation in which comprehension
and problem solutions are being pursued, the direct-contributive
roles require the development of symbol structures that portray
the concepts involved within the situation. But executive roles
in a complex problem situation also require conceptual activity--e.g.,
comprehension, selection, supervision--that can benefit from
well-designed symbol structures and fast, flexible means for
manipulating and displaying them. For complex processes, the
executive problem posed to the human (of gaining the necessary
comprehension and making a good plan) may be tougher than the
problem he faced in the role of direct-contributive worker. If
the flexibility desired for the process hierarchies (to make
room for human cut-and-try methods) is not to be degraded or
abandoned, the executive activity will have to be provided with
fast and flexible symbol-structuring techniques.
The means available to humans today for developing and manipulating
these symbol structures are both laborious and inflexible. It
is hard enough to develop an initial structure of diagrams and
text, but the amount of effort required to make changes is often
prohibitively great; one settles for inflexibility. Also, the
kind of generous flexibility that would be truly helpful calls
for added symbol structuring just to keep track of the trials,
branches, and reasoning thereto that are involved in the development
of the subject structure; our present symbol-manipulation means
would very soon bog down completely among the complexities that
are involved in being more than just a little bit flexible.
We find that the humans in our H-LAM/T systems are essential
working continuously within a symbol structure of some sort,
shifting their attention from one structure to another as they
guide and execute the processes that ultimately provide them
with the comprehension and the problem solutions that they seek.
This view increases our respect for the essential importance
of the basic capability of composing and modifying efficient
symbol structures. Such a capability depends heavily upon the
particular concepts that are isolated and manipulated as entities,
upon the symbology used to represent them, upon the artifacts
that help to manipulate and display the symbols, and upon the
methodology for developing and using symbol structures. In other
words, this capability depends heavily upon proper language,
artifacts, and methodology, our basic augmentation means.
When the course of action must respond to new comprehension,
new insights and new intuitive flashes of possible explanations
or solutions, it will not be an orderly process. Existing means
of composing and working with symbol structures penalize disorderly
processes very heavily, and it is part of the real promise in
the automated H-LAM/T systems of tomorrow that the human can
have the freedom and power of disorderly processes.
f. Compound Effects
Since many processes in many levels of the hierarchy are involved
in the execution of a single higher-level process of the system,
any factor that influences process execution in general will
have a highly compounded total effect upon the system's performance.
There are several such factors which merit special attention.
Basic human cognitive powers, such as memory intelligence,
or pattern perception can have such a compounded effect. The
augmentation means employed today have generally evolved among
large statistical populations, and no attempt has been made to
fit them to individual needs and abilities. Each individual tends
to evolve his own variations, but there is not enough mutation
and selection activity, nor enough selection feedback, to permit
very significant changes. A good, automated H-LAM/T system should
provide the opportunity for a significant adaptation of the augmentation
means to individual characteristics. The compounding effect of
fundamental human cognitive powers suggests further that systems
designed for maximum effectiveness would require that these powers
be developed as fully as possible--by training, special mental
tricks, improved language, new methodology.
In the automated system that we contemplate, the human should
be able to draw on explicit-artifact process capability at many
levels in the repertoire hierarchy; today, artifacts are involved
explicitly in only the lower-order capabilities. In the future
systems, for instance, it should be possible to have computer
processes provide direct and significant help in his processes
at many levels. We thus expect the effect of the computer in
the system to be very much compounded. A great deal of richness
in the future possibilities for automated H-LAM/T systems is
implied here--considerably more than many people realize who
would picture the computer as just helping them do the things
they do now. This type of compounding is related to the reverberating
waves of change discussed in Section II-A.
Another factor can exert this type of compound effect upon
over-all system performance: the human's unconscious processes.
Clinical psychology seems to provide clear evidence that a large
proportion of a human's everyday activity is significantly mediated
or basically prompted by unconscious mental processes that, although
"natura" in a functional sense, are not rational. The
observable mechanisms of these processes (observable by another,
trained person) includes masking of the irrationality of the
human's actions which are so affected, so that few of us will
admit that our actions might be irrational, and most of us can
construct satisfying rationales for any action that may be challenged.
Anything that might have so general an effect upon our mental
actions as is implied here, is certainly a candidate for ultimate
consideration in the continuing development of our intellectual
effectiveness. It may be that the first stages of research on
augmenting the human intellect will have to proceed without being
able to do anything about this problem except accommodate to
it as well as possible. This may be one of the very significant
problems whose solution awaits our development of increased intellectual
effectiveness.
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